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THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978:
PROBLEMS WITH THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S DISCRETION AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first
enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place,
oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the
primary controul on the government; but experience has taught man-
kind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the conclusion of the Watergate affair, Congress began
to consider proposals to provide for an independent prosecutor to investi-
gate alleged criminal activities by senior executive branch and campaign
officials. 2 In succeeding sessions of Congress, numerous bills were intro-
duced providing for various mechanisms to achieve this end.3 Finally, in
October of 1978, Congress enacted the special prosecutor provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act (the Ethics Act).4
Both the original and the amended versions 5 of the Ethics Act rely
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
2. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 8-11, 140-42, 192-93 (1974) (discussing proposal to establish a special commission to study the
establishment of an independent permanent mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of offi-
cial misconduct and other offenses committed by high government officials).
3. See Brief for the Appellants at Addendum A, Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (providing compendium of twenty-five special prosecutor bills introduced in the 94th and 95th
Congresses).
4. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982)). Under the special prosecutor provisions as
originally enacted, the Attorney General was required to conduct a preliminary investigation upon
receiving "specific information" that the President, the Vice-President, a cabinet member, or any of
certain other government officials had violated any federal criminal law not constituting a petty
offense. Id. § 601(a), 92 Stat. at 1867-68. If the Attorney General found that the matter warranted
further investigation, or if ninety days elapsed without a determination by the Attorney General that
the matter was "so unsubstantiated as not to warrant further investigation," the Attorney General
was required to apply to a special three-judge court for the appointment of a special prosecutor to
investigate the charges. Id. at 1868.
5. In 1982, Congress made minor changes in the special prosecutor sections and extended
them for five more years. Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409,
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upon the Attorney General to trigger the special prosecutor process,
which can lead to the recusal of the Department of Justice in appropriate
cases.
6
This note examines the possibilities for review of certain of the de-
terminations left to the Attorney General under the Ethics Act through a
discussion of the three cases, Nathan v. Attorney General,7 Banzhaf v.
Smith,8 and Dellums v. Smith,9 which have been brought by private liti-
gants seeking judicial review of decisions by the Attorney General not to
conduct preliminary investigations.10 The note argues that it is clear that
future courts will neither confer standing upon private parties to chal-
lenge such decisions nor recognize any sort of judicial review of the ac-
tions of the Attorney General," either under the Ethics Act itself or
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. 12 The note then offers a
critique of various proposals that provide for limited review of decisions
made by the Attorney General under the Ethics Act, including confer-
ring standing upon private citizens to challenge such decisions in district
§§ 4-7, 96 Stat. 2039, 2040-42. Under the current version of the Ethics Act, the Attorney General is
required to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receiving information that he "determines is
sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate" whether any person covered by the statute has engaged
in the proscribed conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). In determining whether
grounds to investigate exist, the Attorney General must consider both "the degree of specificity of
the information received" and "the credibility of the source of the information." Id. The Attorney
General is obliged to petition for the appointment of an independent counsel if he "finds reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted, or if ninety days elapse from
the receipt of the information without a determination by the Attorney General that there are no
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted." 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(c)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). Also included in the 1982 amendments was a provision chang-
ing the name of the special prosecutor to "independent counsel" in order to "reduce the stigma of,
and remove the Watergate connotation from, a special prosecutor investigation." S.REP. No. 496,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982).
Two key sections of the Ethics Act that were not altered by the 1982 amendments address the
ability of entities outside the Justice Department to review certain of the decisions made by the
Attorney General. Section 592(b)(1) states that the special three-judge court shall have no power to
appoint an independent counsel if the Attorney General timely notifies it of his finding that there are
no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1)
(1982). Under section 592(0, the Attorney General's determination to apply for the appointment of
an independent counsel is not reviewable in any court. 28 U.S.C. § 592(0 (1982).
6. See supra notes 4-5. One legislator involved in the 1982 amendments pointed out that, as a
result of the "broad language" of the Ethics Act, the Attorney General "becomes the gate that either
opens or closes" the independent counsel mechanism. Ethics in Government Act Amendments of
1982: Hearings on S. 2059 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the
Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Rudman).
7. 557 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
8. 588 F. Supp. 1498 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
9. 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), argued, No. 84-1525 (9th Cir. June 11, 1984).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 18-75.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
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court,13 allowing Congress to seek writs of mandamus against the Attor-
ney General, 14 empowering the special three-judge panel created by the
Ethics Act to review the Attorney General's decisions, 15 and establishing
an independent law enforcement agency to administer the Ethics Act. 16
Congress should consider these proposals, especially the idea of an in-
dependent agency, if it truly wants to transform the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics Act into something more than "merely a pious
statement of pure political import to assuage the public's concern for
abuses of trust that followed Watergate."17
II. THE CASES CHALLENGING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ETHICS
ACT DECISIONS
A. Background.
1. The Nathan Case. In 1982, two persons who were injured and
the legal representatives of those who were killed in a violent incident in
Greensboro, North Carolina 18 presented the Attorney General with in-
formation that they felt demonstrated that high federal officials had au-
thorized or negligently permitted violations of civil rights and had later
conspired to cover up the government's involvement.19 The Justice De-
partment, claiming that the allegations did not provide specific informa-
tion that a person covered by the Ethics Act had violated a federal
criminal law, rejected the request for a special prosecutor, and refused to
conduct even a preliminay investigation. 20 The individuals who had pro-
vided the information claimed that it was sufficiently specific and filed
suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a writ of
mandamus to force the Attorney General to carry out his duties under
the Ethics Act.21
2. The Banzhaf Case. In 1983, two law professors submitted to
the Attorney General information concerning the Reagan campaign's use
13. See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 103-108.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 109-116.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 117-130.
17. Nathan, 557 F. Supp. at 1190.
18. In 1979, while conducting a parade in the city of Greensboro, members of the Communist
Workers' Party were attacked by members of the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party.
Several demonstrators were killed or wounded in the attack. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1979, at Al, col.
5.
19. Letter from P. Lewis Pitts to Attorney General William French Smith (Mar. 24, 1982) (on
file with Duke Law Journal).
20. Letter from Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds to P. Lewis Pitts (July
19, 1982) (on file with Duke Law Journal).
21. Nathan, 557 F. Supp. at 1187.
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of Carter campaign material in 1980. They believed that this information
sufficiently established the possibility of a federal crime by high-ranking
government officials and therefore warranted application of the Ethics
Act.22 In response to their demand for an independent counsel, the Jus-
tice Department explained that a non-Ethics Act investigation of the
matter was already underway. 23 Dissatisfied with this explanation, the
two professors filed for a writ of mandamus against the Attorney
General.24
3. The Dellums Case. In 1983, three individuals25 submitted a
letter to the Attorney General containing information purporting to
show that seven public officals covered by the Ethics Act26 had violated
the Neutrality Act by conspiring with private persons to conduct a
paramilitary expedition for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan
government. 27 The Justice Department responded to their request for an
independent counsel by claiming that the material provided was not suffi-
ciently specific to trigger a preliminary investigation. 28 The individuals
who had provided the information filed a lawsuit in the District Court
for the Northern District of California demanding a preliminary investi-
gation under the Ethics Act, or, in the alternative, the appointment of an
independent counsel.29
B. The Decisions in the Three Cases.
1. Overview. The plaintiffs in the Nathan, Banzhaf, and Dellums
cases all prevailed at the district court level. They obtained relief in the
form of writs of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to conduct a
22. Brief for the Appellants at 2, 6-7, Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
two professors were John F. Banzhaf III and Peter H. Meyers of George Washington University.
23. Id. at 8 (citing Letter from Criminal Division of Justice Department to Professors Banzhaf
and Meyers). In the subsequent litigation arising out of the refusal to conduct a preliminary investi-
gation, the Attorney General argued that the information provided by the plaintiffs, "while volumi-
nous, cannot be considered 'specific' information of criminal misconduct by an official covered by the
Ethics Act." Id at 55.
24. Id. at 9.
25. The three individuals were Ronald V. Dellums, a congressman from California, Eleanor
Ginsberg, a resident of Florida, and Dr. Myrna Cunningham, a resident of Nicaragua. Brief for the
Appellants at 5, Dellums v. Smith, No. 84-1525 (9th Cir. argued June 11, 1984).
26. The seven officials were President Ronald Reagan, ex-Secretary of State Alexander Haig,
Jr., Secretary of State George Schultz, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nestor Sanchez, and CIA Di-
rector William Casey. Id at 5-6.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 6-7 (quoting Letter from Assistant Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen to Dellums,
Ginsberg, and Cunningham (Mar. 18, 1983)).
29. Id at 7.
[Vol. 1985:497
Vol. 1985:497] ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978 501
preliminary investigation as provided for in the Ethics Act,30 or, because
ninety days had elapsed since the information was presented, to apply to
the special three-judge court for the appointment of an independent
counsel.31 The courts in each of the three cases found no merit in the
Attorney General's contention that the information provided was not
sufficiently specific to trigger an Ethics Act investigation. 32
On appeal, however, the Department of Justice obtained unanimous
reversals in both Banzhaf and Nathan.33 The Justice Department has
also perfected an appeal in Dellums, but the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has yet to issue an opinion in that case.3 4
This note will not address the narrow factual question of whether
the information provided to the Attorney General in the three cases was
sufficiently "specific" within the meaning of the Ethics Act to trigger a
preliminary investigation. 35 Rather, the focus will be on the two more
fundamental issues presented in the cases: (1) whether a private citizen
has standing to challenge the actions of the Attorney General under the
Ethics Act, and (2) whether Congress intended to allow review of the
Attorney General's Ethics Act decisions via a private cause of action.
The answers to those two questions will, in turn, determine the need for
changes in the Ethics Act.
30. Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489, 1505 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Nathan v. Attorney Gen., 563
F. Supp. 815, 816-17 (D.D.C. 1983). The Nathan court declined to compel immediate application
for appointment of a special prosecutor due to the lack of any showing that the Attorney General
had acted in bad faith in failing to undertake a preliminary investigation. Nathan, 563 F. Supp. at
816-17.
31. Banzhaf, 588 F. Supp. at 1508 (ordering this type of relief because more than nine months
had elapsed since sufficient information was provided and the Ethics Act provides that "where there
is that kind of a delay, the next step is not another investigation"). Although the court did not cite a
specific section of the Ethics Act for this proposition, it was apparently relying upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(c)(1) (1982), the provisions of which are listed in note 5, supra.
32. Banzhaf v. Smith, 588 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (D.D.C. 1984); Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp.
1489, 1504 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Nathan v. Attorney Gen., 563 F.Supp. 815, 816 (D.D.C. 1983).
33. Banzhafv. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nathan v. Attorney Gen., 737 F.2d 1069
(D.C. Cir. 1984). In Nathan, one of the grounds for reversal was that the plaintiffs had not supplied
sufficient "specific information" to the Attorney General to trigger a preliminary investigation. Na-
than, 737 F.2d at 1076-77 (Davis, J., concurring). In Banzhaf the court of appeals expressly de-
clined to rule on the issue of the specificity of the factual information. Banzhaf 737 F.2d at 1168.
34. Dellumn No. 84-1525 (9th Cir. argued June 11, 1984).
35. Although this note will not address the issue of the specificity of the information provided
to the Attorney General in these three cases, it should be pointed out that Congress intended the
threshold of specificity to be a low one indeed. The legislative history of the Ethics Act states that "a
letter saying that a particular member of the President's cabinet is a 'crook,' but [providing] no
further information or factual support regarding alleged criminal activity,... would not constitute
specific information." However, "if someone charges that a cabinet secretary took a bribe on July 1,
1976 in New Orleans," that information is apparently "specific" enough to require a preliminary
investigation. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, 55 (1977).
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2. Do Private Citizens Have Standing to Challenge the Actions of
the Attorney General Under the Ethics Act? The district courts in Na-
than, Banzhaf, and Dellums all applied basically the same standard in
analyzing the question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit
under the Ethics Act.36 That is, in order to establish standing, the plain-
tiffs had to show: (1) that they had personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the defendant's putatively illegal conduct;
(2) that the injury was fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3)
that the injury was likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. 37 Fur-
ther, because the plaintiffs sought review of the actions of a governmental
agency, they had to show that the interest sought to be protected was
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute. . . in question. '38
The district courts agreed that if the Ethics Act were construed as
conferring upon a person who provides sufficient information to the At-
torney General a procedural right to have those allegations investigated,
the denial of that right would constitute a legally cognizable injury and
all of the criteria for standing would be satisfied.39 The Nathan court
inferred the existence of such a procedural right from the structure and
purpose of the Ethics Act,4o and the courts in the other two cases
adopted this interpretation as well. 41 The courts reasoned that a person
who presented sufficient information to invoke the Ethics Act provisions
36. Compare Dellums v. Smith, 573 F.Supp. 1489, 1494 (N.D. Cal. 1983), with Nathan v. At-
torney Gen., 557 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (D.D.C. 1983), and Banzhafv. Smith, 588 F. Supp. 1489, 1493
(D.D.C. 1984).
37. Dellums, 573 F.Supp. at 1494 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)). These three factors are "an irreducible minimum" that
must be satisfied to show standing. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
38. Dellums, 573 F.Supp. at 1494 (quoting Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-
54 (1970)); see, eg., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (applying "zone of interests" test to
find standing in group of tenant farmers to challenge the actions of a federal agency).
39. Banzhaf v. Smith, 588 F. Supp. 1489, 1493-94 (D.D.C. 1984); Dellums v. Smith, 573 F.
Supp. 1489, 1494-96 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Nathan v. Attorney Gen., 557'F. Supp. 1186, 1189-90
(D.D.C. 1983).
40. The Nathan court reasoned that:
[i]f not plaintiffs, who can be said to have a cause of action to insist that the Act be carried
out in accordance with its terms? The Special Division of the Court responsible for ap-
pointing Special Prosecutors, to which this matter was initially presented, has ruled it has
no jurisdiction. . . . Nor does Congress have any special enforcement power; under the
Act members of the Judiciary Committees of the House or Senate can only request ap-
pointment of a Special Prosecutor, and, in any event, if the Attorney General ignores his
duty to investigate and report to Congress, Congress remains uninformed and cannot act.
Thus if the Act is enforceable at all it must be through those, like plaintiffs here, who have
supplied specific information and pursue their application for an investigation in the Dis-
trict Court.
Nathan, 557 F. Supp. at 1189.
41. Banzhaf, 588 F. Supp. at 1494; Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1495.
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would have standing to seek review of the Attorney General's failure to
invoke those provisions. Given this construction of the statute, the dis-
trict courts found that the particular plaintiffs had standing to challenge
the Ethics Act decisions of the Attorney General.42
As the Banzhaf and Dellums courts pointed out, the fact that no one
would have standing if these plaintiffs were denied standing to sue was
not in itself a reason to find standing. The courts noted that in certain
circumstances no one has standing because Congress has left some deci-
sions to the political process.4 3 This reasoning was found to be inapplica-
ble here, however, since "[i]n order to preserve confidence in government
accountability, Congress, by enacting the Ethics in Government Act...
removed certain actions and determinations from the oft-hidden realm of
the 'political process.' "44
Both Nathan and Banzhaf were reversed on appeal. In reversing the
district court's decision in Nathan, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit issued three separate concurring opinions.45 Only
Judge Bork addressed the standing issue,46 and most of his analysis of the
plaintiff's lack of standing was subsumed in his discussion of the absence
of any private cause of action under the Ethics Act.47 According to
Bork, the issue of relief sought by the plaintiffs fell within the principle of
executive control of decisions to prosecute, for "the preliminary investi-
gation is the first stage of the prosecutorial process. .... The only pur-
pose of the preliminary investigation . . . is to enable a report to the
42. Banzhaf 588 F. Supp. at 1494-95 ("Where Congress has provided that, upon request of a
citizen, the government has a duty to act and the government then fails to act, the person making the
request has standing to enforce his right to government action by a lawsuit in federal court."); Del-
lums, 573 F. Supp. at 1496 ("plaintiffs have standing because Congress conferred upon them a right
to a judicial determination"); Nathan, 557 F. Supp. at 1189 ("Standing will be granted to plaintiffs to
challenge the Attorney General for failing to report to the Special Division after receiving the infor-
mation plaintiffs provided.").
43. Banzhaf 588 F. Supp. at 1495 n.32; Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1497.
44. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1497.
45. Nathan, 737 F.2d at 1069.
46. Judge Davis' opinion focused on the issue of whether the plaintiffs had supplied sufficient
"specific information" to the Attorney General and did not address the "substantial questions as to
the standing of these plaintiffs to sue under the Ethics in Government Act." Ia at 1072 (Davis, J.,
concurring). Judge Edwards concurred solely in the result reached in the case. Id. at 1082 (Ed-
wards, J., concurring).
47. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. Judge Bork reasoned that:
Subject to Article III considerations, plaintiffs have standing to sue under this Act only if
Congress has created a legal right "the invasion of which creates standing." Whether Con-
gress has created that right turns on congressional intent, as does the existence of a private
cause of action. The two inquiries merge. And, since my analysis of congressional intent
demonstrates no intent to create a private remedy, plaintiffs have no standing to bring this
suit.
Nathan, 737 F.2d at 1077 n.2 (Bork, J., concurring) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617 n.3 (1973)).
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special division of this court about the need or the lack of a need for the
appointment of an independent counsel."' 48 Because a citizen lacks
standing to challenge prosecutorial decisions when he is not personally
threatened with prosecution,49 the plaintiffs in Nathan did not have
standing to challenge the Attorney General's determination not to con-
duct a preliminary investigation.50
Given such a negative reaction by the appellate courts on the ques-
tion of the standing of private citizens to sue under the Ethics Act, it is
unlikely that district courts considering this issue in the future will reach
a contrary conclusion. Thus, the courts have adopted a position that
"would not allow any plaintiffs standing under a statute designed to pro-
tect the public at large." 51
3. Did Congress Intend to Allow Review of the Attorney General's
Ethics Act Decisions by Means of a Private Cause of Action? The second
fundamental issue in the Nathan, Banzhaf, and Dellums cases was
whether a district court judge could review the Attorney General's re-
fusal to investigate specific information of suspected criminal conduct by
officials covered by the Ethics Act at the behest of persons supplying
such information. As the district court in Nathan correctly pointed out,
the "Act is not explicit in defining the role of the federal courts."'5 2 The
only provisions of the Ethics Act that address the issue of judicial review
preclude it under certain circumstances and by certain tribunals.5 3 The
Nathan court inferred from this limited restriction on judicial oversight
an intention on the part of Congress not to foreclose judicial review in
other appropriate circumstances where the court is convinced that the
Attorney General has failed to comply with the Ethics Act. 54 The dis-
trict court in Banzhaf drew a similar inference, reasoning that "[i]f Con-
gress had intended to preclude review by 'any court' of both the Attorney
General's decision to apply for, and his decision not to apply for such
48. Id. at 1079.
49. Id. at 1078 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that the
mother of an illegitimate child lacked standing to enjoin the local district attorney from refusing to
prosecute the father of her child for nonsupport under a Texas criminal statute)).
50. In the Banzhafease, the court of appeals did not directly discuss the issue of the plaintiffs'
standing to sue, basing its reversal instead on the finding that Congress intended to preclude judicial
review of the actions of the Attorney General under the Ethics Act. Banzhaf, 737 F.2d at 1170. See
infra text accompanying notes 69-73.
51. -Brief for the Appellees at 26, Delluis v. Smith, No. 84-1525 (9th Cir. argued June 11,
1984).
52. Nathan, 557 F. Supp. at 1188.
53. See supra note 5.
54. Nathan, 557 F. Supp. at 1188-89.
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appointment, it could have easily done so."'55
Two of the district courts also relied on the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA)56 in finding that the challenged Ethics Act decisions of
the Attorney General were reviewable.57 The Dellums court relied on
the strong presumption under the APA of a right to judicial review un-
less there is clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to
foreclose review.58 It pointed out that review of federal agency action is
authorized unless such review is expressly precluded by statute or the
agency action is "committed to agency discretion."5 9
After determining that no relevant statute precluded judicial review
of the Attorney General's determination, the Dellums court addressed
the question whether this decision lay entirely within the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion.60 It concluded that because Congress had supplied spe-
cific standards to govern the Attorney General's determination, 61 there
was a clear "law to be applied" and thus a standard by which the courts
could measure the lawfulness of his action. As a result, the decision
whether to conduct a preliminary investigation was not committed to
agency discretion, and the APA provided a proper mechanism for re-
view. 62 The district court in Banzhaf agreed with this reasoning,63 ad-
ding that denying reviewability "would ascribe to the lawmakers an
intention to establish an illogical, entirely self-defeating scheme . .. ,
[which] is not the way in which statutes are normally construed." 4
55. Banzhaf 588 F. Supp. at 1502 n.10 (emphasis in original).
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982). Section 702 of the APA provides that "a person suffering a
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." The district court in Dellums
determined that the Attorney General was an "agency" subject to review under the APA and that
"agency action" included a failure to act. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498.
57. Banzhaf, 588 F. Supp. at 1507; Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498-99.
58. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
59. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2) (1982)).
60. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498.
61. In determining whether a preliminary investigation is warranted, the Attorney General
shall consider only the "degree of specificity of the information received" and the "credibility of the
source of the information." 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1982). The court in Dellums explained that the
legislative history supports the construction that "the announced criteria... are the only ones to be
applied in determining whether a preliminary investigation is required." Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at
1498.
62. Dellums, 573 F. Supp. at 1498-99. The court noted that, even if a preliminary investigation
is viewed as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, "Congress clearly intended departure from the
normal rule of executive discretion in the Ethics in Government Act by making a preliminary inves-
tigation mandatory." Id. at 1500.
63. Banzhaf, 588 F. Supp. at 1502 n.10 (if the requisite information is supplied, "the Attorney
General may be required under familiar administrative law principles to perform [this] essentially
ministerial task").
64. Id. at 1503.
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Concurring in the reversal of the district court's finding of review-
ability in Nathan, Judge Bork observed that by precluding judicial review
in certain specified situations Congress did not necessarily intend to al-
low judicial review wherever not expressly barred.65 Further, he felt that
such review raised serious constitutional separation of powers problems
by allowing courts and private parties to challenge decisions properly left
to the prosecutorial discretion of the executive branch; the courts should
not decide this difficult constitutional question unless it was very clear
that Congress intended to raise it.66 Finally, he found that "the conven-
tional indicia of legislative intent" demonstrated that Congress rejected
the concept of a private right of action to enforce the Ethics Act.67 Judge
Bork thus concluded that:
It would be anamolous [sic] for this court to hold that Congress in-
tended, sub silentio, to provide for judicial oversight of the Attorney
General's decisions via a private right of action at the same time Con-
gress was vesting the Attorney General with such wide discretion as to
the scope of the preliminary investigation, as well as the determination
of whether to conduct any investigation at all.68
The court of appeals in Banzhaf announced that the APA provided
the proper framework for analyzing the issue of whether the Attorney
General's Ethics Act decisions are reviewable.69 Relying on the recent
Supreme Court case of Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,70 the
court found that the presumption of reviewability under the APA could
be overcome by specific statutory language, specific legislative history, or
inferences of intent drawn from the overall statutory scheme.71 Like the
court of appeals in Nathan, it drew an inference of nonreviewability from
the fact that Congress had considered and rejected reviewability provi-
sions in two predecessor bills to what eventually became the Ethics
Act.72 In addition to the implications of this legislative history, the ap-
pellate court in Banzhaf concluded that it was apparent from the lan-
65. Nathan, 737 F.2d at 1082 (Bork, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 1077-79.
67. Id. at 1079-80. For example, the Ethics Act creates no mechanism for considering citizen
complaints, nor does it require the Attorney General to make his findings public or to report them to
the complaining party. Further, earlier Congresses had considered and rejected similar bills provid-
ing for a private cause of action, and "[s]ince courts only infer private remedies in 'atypical situa-
tion[s],' . . . we must be extremely reluctant to add a private right of action to a statute when
Congress specifically contemplated, but did not enact, the same addition." Id. at 1080-81 (citing
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).
68. Id at 1080.
69. Banzhaf 737 F.2d at 1168.
70. 104 S. Ct. 2450 (1984).
71. Banzhaf 737 F.2d at 1169 (citing Community Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. at 2456).
72. Banzhaf 737 F.2d at 1170 (citing H.R. 11476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) and S. 495, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)).
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guage and structure of the Ethics Act that Congress intended to preclude
review. 73 Therefore, review of the Attorney General's actions was not
available under the A-PA.
Given the unanimous nature of the reversals in Nathan and
Banzhaf, it is unlikely that district courts considering the issue of review-
ability in the future will come to the contrary conclusion. Thus, we must
assume that, notwithstanding the congressional experience during
Watergate with the indifference, or worse, of the then Attorney Gen-
eral to the crimes being committed around him, it intended to vest sole
and unquestionable authority in the Attorney General to decide
whether and under what circumstances the Independent Counsel
mechanism was to be activated.74
Such a reading of the Ethics Act renders it in effect "nothing more than a
hortatory statement from the Congress to the Executive Branch."75
With the closing of these judicial avenues under the present Ethics Act,
the only certain solution for putting teeth into the Ethics Act appears to
lie in amending it in order to withdraw some of the discretion from the
Attorney General.
III. A CRITIQUE OF PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE ETHICS ACT TO
PROVIDE FOR LIMITED REVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S DECISIONS
A. The Ineffectiveness of Existing Safeguards.
If judicial review of the Attorney General's Ethics Act decisions at
the behest of private citizens is precluded, we are left with only three
safeguards against a possible abuse of discretion by the Attorney General
in refusing to trigger the independent counsel process in appropriate cir-
cumstances. The three safeguards are: (1) the congressional oversight
mechanism provided for in section 595(e);76 (2) the option that the spe-
73. Banzhaf 737 F.2d at 1169-70. The indicia of such intent included: (I) provisions of the
Ethics Act that severely delimit judicial review of the Attorney General's actions (sections 592(f)
and 592(b)(1)); (2) the lack of any provision allowing members of the public to petition the Attorney
General to act; (3) the presence of section 595(e), which gives Congress the power to request the
Attorney General to apply for an independent counsel; and (4) provisions of the Ethics Act designed
to prevent the premature disclosure of allegations of criminal conduct that might prove to be un-
founded (sections 592(b)(3), 592(d)(2), 593(b), and 595(e)), a goal that would be undermined by
allowing such charges to be aired in the district courts.
74. Banzhaf 588 F. Supp. at 1503 (footnote omitted).
75. Id at 1495-96 (footnote omitted).
76. This section provides that:
A majority of majority party members or a majority of all nonmajority party members of
the Committee on the Judiciary of either House of the Congress may request in writing
that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of a [sic] independent counsel. Not
later than thirty days after the receipt of such a request, or not later than fifteen days after
the completion of a preliminary investigation of the matter with respect to which the re-
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cial three-judge panel or the Judiciary Committee of either house of the
Congress make public the information received by the Attorney General
and his justification for not applying for the appointment of an independ-
ent counsel;77 and (3) the ultimate power possessed by Congress to im-
peach the Attorney General.78 Each of these controls, however, has
serious deficiencies, and none of them ensures that the Ethics Act will
meet "the need for statutorily established circumstances in which the At-
torney General must conduct a preliminary investigation, appoint a spe-
cial prosecutor, and report his activities to the court."'79
The ineffectiveness of the congressional oversight mechanism was
clearly demonstrated in the Dellums case. A majority of the Democratic
party members of the House Judiciary Committee submitted a formal
request pursuant to Section 595(e) for an independent counsel to deter-
mine whether the Neutrality Act had been violated by officials covered
by the Ethics Act. 80 Nevertheless, the Attorney General persisted in his
refusal to conduct even a preliminary investigation of the matter.81 In
the face of this simple refusal to act, Congress was powerless under the
Ethics Act to enforce its request.82 Even the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, which reported the Ethics Act favorably, recognized
the limited effectiveness of the congressional oversight provisions. 83
quest is made, whichever is later, the Attorney General shall provide written notification of
any action the Attorney General has taken in response to such request and, if no applica-
tion has been made to the division of the court, why such application was not made. Such
written notification shall be provided to the committee on which the persons making the
request serve, and shall not be revealed to any third party, except that the committee may,
either on its own initiative or upon the request of the Attorney General, make public such
portion or portions of such notification as will not in the committee's judgment prejudice
the rights of any individual.
28 U.S.C. § 595(e) (1982).
77. The statutory bases of this authority are 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(b)(3), 595(e) (1982).
78. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
79. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1982) (emphasis added).
80. See Letter from Majority of Democratic Party Members of the House Commmittee on the
Judiciary to Attorney General William F. Smith (Apr. 9, 1984) (on file with Duke Law Journal).
81. See Brief for the Appellees at 2 & n.1, Dellums v. Smith, No. 84-1525 (9th Cir. argued June
11, 1984).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978) (dissenting views of Reps. Wiggins,
McClory, Butler, Moorhead, and Kindness) ("Although the House or Senate Judiciary Committees,
in whole or in part, may request the Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor, [the provi-
sion] creates no more power to enforce that request than now exists.").
83. The report stated that:
If the reason for not appointing a special prosecutor is the fact that the matter is so unsub-
stantiated as to not warrant further investigation or prosecution, the Attorney General's
explanation under this subsection need only state that fact. . . .The explanation and spe-
cific reasons required by this subsection relate [only] to the Attorney General's decision
under clause 593(e)(3)(C) that a conflict of interest as defined in paragraph (1) of subsec-
tion 592(e) exists.
S. RaP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1977) (emphasis added).
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The option to publicize the information received by the Attorney
General and his stated reasons for refusing to take action is also seriously
flawed as a method for controlling abuse of discretion under the Ethics
Act. Such a safeguard makes the efficacy of the statutory scheme depend
"on the degree of the public clamor" and "how many decibels we get
from the public on any particular issue," seemingly a fallback to the old
"public hue and cry."584 While public clamor was ultimately successful in
resolving the Watergate affair, the Ethics Act was designed, in part, to
provide for a quicker and more orderly resolution of charges of govern-
mental misconduct.8 5 Further, such action on the part of the courts or
Congress would defeat the clear intent reflected in the Ethics Act to pro-
tect individuals accused of criminal conduct by preventing the public dis-
closure of the information presented to the Attorney General or the
results of any preliminary investigation.8 6
Finally, the ultimate power of impeachment possessed by Congress
is far too unwieldy and time-consuming to act as an effective mechanism
to control abuses of discretion.8 7 It is clear that "the enactment of the
Ethics Act is testimony that Congress did not believe that resort to the
extraordinary impeachment remedy was the appropriate means for
resolving problems of [this] type."188 The Ethics Act allows the executive
branch to function during the investigation of one or more of its
members.89
Because of such serious shortcomings in the existing mechanisms for
controlling abuse of discretion under the Ethics Act, it appears that the
statute "assumes an honest Attorney General,. . . a law-abiding Attor-
84. 126 CONG. REc. 15,265 (1980) (statement of Sen. Weicker). Representative Wiggins, an
opponent of the Ethics Act, observed that the statute "presupposes dishonest people in the executive
branch who would not perhaps react to that kind of public pressure if it were contrary to their self-
interest." 124 CONG. REc. 36,463 (1978).
85. Cf 124 CONG. REc. 31,976 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("public opinion is not always
easy to mobilize and it is foolish to wait until a grave crisis has developed before establishing worka-
ble procedures to meet that crisis").
86. See supra note 73; see also S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1977) ("[j]ust
because a person holds a high-level position does not justify making unsubstantiated allegations of
criminal conduct public").
87. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice supra note 2, at 8 (prepared state-
ment of Sen. Cranston) ("impeachment by Congress of high Federal office holders in modern times
ordinarily is too cumbersome and consumes too much of Congress' time").
88. Banzhaf v. Smith, 588 F. Supp. 1498, 1503 n.15 (D.D.C. 1984).
89. Normal functioning of the executive branch is possible in such situations because the Ethics
Act "assures even the most cynical members of the public and the press that allegations against high
level officials will always be examined fairly and objectively." Committee on Federal Legislation,
The Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 36 REc. A.B. Crry N.Y.
420, 429 (1981).
510 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1985:497
ney General, someone who will fulfill his oath of office." 90 This assump-
tion is clearly misplaced in legislation that presumably was designed "to
create an institutional framework so that we wouldn't have to rely on the
good faith of any Attorney General, and [to ensure] that the Government
would respond regardless of the motivation of any particular Attorney
General." 91
Due to the inadequacy of the existing safeguards, "the mechanism
created by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 for the appointment of
temporary special prosecutors has proven to be unresponsive ...
[b]ecause the Attorney General plays the central role in the process of
appointing a special prosecutor."'92 Until the Ethics Act is amended to
provide for some sort of limited review of the Attorney General's deci-
sions, it will continue to be ineffective as a means of controlling the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General when he is asked to investigate
allegations of criminal conduct by high-ranking executive branch
90. Special Prosecutor Legislation: Hearings on HR. 2835 and Related Bills Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1977)
(statement of Acting Assistant Attorney General John M. Harmon).
91. Provision for Special Prosecutor: Hearings on H.R. 14476, H.R. 11357, H.R. 11999, H.R.
8281, HR. 8039, H-R. 15634, and Title I of S. 495 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). Such
reliance is particularly questionable when the Attorney General publicly declares his personal belief
that the Ethics Act is unconstitutional. See Letter from Attorney General William F. Smith to
Senate Legal Counsel Michael Davidson (Apr. 17, 1981), reprinted in Special Prosecutor Provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management of the Senate Comm on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 130-31 (1981) ("In
some or all of its applications, the Act appears fundamentally to contradict the principle of separa-
tion of powers erected by the Constitution."); see also Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1981, at A26, col. 1
(editorial stating that "no attorney general should have to trigger a complicated mechanism that he
believes is unconstitutional") (emphasis in original). Despite the Justice Department's position on
the Ethics Act, then Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani told congressmen considering
amendments to the statute that "there should be no concern, either within the Congress or for the
public, that the law will not be applied." Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1981).
Congress should be skeptical of this assurance that the Ethics Act will be faithfully adminis-
tered in view of the fact that on at least one previous occasion former Attorney General Smith
interfered with the functioning of a statute being utilized to control abuses by executive officials. In
December of 1982, after the full House had voted to charge EPA Director Anne Burford with
contempt of Congress, Smith declined to turn the contempt citation over to a grand jury as required
by statutory mandate, 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1982), and instead sued the House of Representatives in an
attempt to block the contempt citation. Comment, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches" An Examination of the Constitutional Balance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney
General, I 1 PEPPERDiNE L. REv. 331, 368 (1984). See generally Note, The Conflict Between Execu-
tive Privilege and Congressional Oversight The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1333, 1334-38
(providing an overview of the dispute and the eventual compromise).
92. 126 CONG. REc. 15,263 (1980) (statement of Sen. Weicker). Senator Weicker added that,
despite the announced purpose of the Ethics Act, the "process is still very much. . . in the hands or
in the judgments of the political appointees of [the] Administration." Id. at 15,265.
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officials.93
B. Proposals to Amend the Ethics Act.
This section will critique several proposals providing for limited re-
viewability of the Attorney General's Ethics Act decisions. The Justice
Department would undoubtedly raise constitutional objections should
such amendments be considered. The constitutionality of the present
statute is supported by constitutional experts94 and professional organi-
zations,95 and the following proposals pose no greater separation of pow-
ers problems than do the current provisions. Therefore, the focus in this
section will be on some of the practical consequences of adopting any of
the suggested amendments.
1. Confer Standing Upon Private Citizens to Challenge the Ethics
Act Decisions of the Attorney General in District Court. One method of
amending the Ethics Act to eliminate the Attorney General's unfettered
discretion whether to trigger the independent counsel mechanism would
be to provide explicitly in the statute for standing for the private citizens
93. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978) (dissenting views of Reps. Wiggins,
McClory, Butler, Moorhead, and Kindness) (Ethics Act "merely engages in cosmetic convolutions
which return us to the point of origin" and offers "[n]o more protection than [previously existed]
against the untrustworthy Attorney General").
94. See, eg., Special Prosecutor Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973) (testimony of Prof. Archibald Cox); ia at 319 (testimony of Prof. Philip B.
Kurland); id. at 339 (article by Prof. Raoul Berger); id at 341 (testimony of Prof. Paul Freund); see
also Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: 4n Examination
of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Eth-
ics in Government4Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113, 126-38 (1982) (helpful analysis of the constitu-
tional issues raised by the Ethics Act).
95. See, eg., Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, supra note 91, at
434, 446-47 (statement of Herbert S. Miller on behalf of the ABA); Memorandum of Common
Cause as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Constitutionality of the Special Prosecutor Law, Kraft v.
Gallinghouse, No. 80-2954 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 1981); Committee on Federal Legislation, The Special
Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 36 Rac. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 420, 422-25
(1981).
Not surprisingly, the primary opponents of the constitutionality of the Ethics Act have been
persons threatened with investigation and prosecution under its provisions, and members of the
Department of Justice who feel that the existence of such a statute fosters a belief that they cannot be
trusted. See, eg., Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, supra note 91, at
116 (statement of Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Attorney General) (expressing strong doubts about
the constitutionality of the Ethics Act); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Prelimi-
nary Injunction, Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 (D.D.C. 1980), reprinted in Special Prosecutor
Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, supra note 91, at 294, 301-12 (brief on behalf of
Timothy Kraft, the subject of a special prosecutor investigation, challenging the constitutionality of
the Ethics Act); see also Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, supra note
91, at 210 (statement of Fred Wertheimer, President of Common Cause) ("it is not unusual for
Justice Department officials of either party to raise concerns about special prosecutor legislation...
in the context of the invasion of the Justice Department's responsibility").
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who provided the information to challenge such decisions. As noted ear-
lier,96 a similar provision was included in some of the predecessor bills to
what eventually became the Ethics Act. The obvious benefit of this pro-
posal is that it removes from the Attorney General's hands the absolute
power to thwart the purpose of the Ethics Act by simply preventing a
potentially serious allegation from reaching even the preliminary investi-
gation stage. A helpful analogy can be drawn to statutes that allow pri-
vate litigants in the antitrust field to bring actions for treble damages.
Such legislation has proved to be extremely effective, leading some to
believe that the private attorney general procedure could be utilized suc-
cessfully in the independent counsel area as well. 97 Such a provision, in
essence, would codify the decisions of the district courts in Nathan,
Banzhaf, and Dellums.
However, serious problems would arise if this concept of the private
attorney general were extended into the area of criminal misconduct by
high-ranking government officials. Such private actions would have to be
confined to a single district court, for the multiplicity of standards and
rulings that would result from allowing the more than five hundred dis-
trict court judges to review the Attorney General's actions in various
cases would create confusion as to the proper legal standard to be applied
in this sensitive area.98 More importantly, the outcome of each review of
a decision by the Attorney General under the Ethics Act would be sub-
ject in large part to the varying abilities of the individuals bringing the
action to litigate effectively. When the possibility of criminal misconduct
by a high-ranking government official is at issue, the effort to investigate
the matter thoroughly and to bring charges if warranted is so inherently
within the public interest that it should not be made to depend upon the
resources of any one private citizen. 99 An even greater danger of such a
system is that it would allow even frivolous charges of criminal activity
to be publicized, defeating the provisions in the Ethics Act reflecting
Congress's clear concerns with privacy. 1°° The private attorney general
96. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
97. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice, supra note 2, at 181 (statement of
former Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin) (extending private attorney general concept to
legislation in this area could promote "the faithful execution of the laws even where an administra-
tion seeks to avoid enforcing congressional acts").
98. Although this criticism could apply to any legal standard that must be applied by numerous
courts, the strong public interest inherent in cases involving possible misconduct by high-ranking
government officials uniquely calls for a single standard of justice applicable in all situations.
99. Although plaintiffs' skills vary widely in cases involving other major issues as well, litigants
in areas in which strong public interests are involved (e.g., school desegregation) have often received
assistance from powerful organizations such as the NAACP and the ACLU. It is not certain that
plaintiffs in cases alleging misconduct by government officials would receive such assistance.
100. See supra note 73.
[Vol. 1985:497
Vol. 1985:497] ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978 513
procedure would empower any individual to transform a private allega-
tion against a high-ranking executive branch official into a widely publi-
cized judicial proceeding. Further, the invocation of the judicial process
would dignify such charges regardless of how groundless they ultimately
proved to be.101 The possibility for abuse of such a mechanism was illus-
trated in historical terms by one constitutional scholar who observed that
allowing private citizens to play such an integral role in this area could
usher in a new era of McCarthyism. 10 2
Because the court in which a private citizen could sue would possess
the authority to affirm the Attorney General's determination that the
charges were groundless, the specter of McCarthyism may well be over-
stated. However, the numerous problems that would arise from a provi-
sion conferring standing upon private parties who submit information to
the Attorney General to challenge his Ethics Act decisions indicate that
this is not a good solution to the ineffectiveness of the current statute.
2. Make the Congressional Oversight Mechanism Effective by Giv-
ing Congress the Power to Seek Writs of Mandamus to Compel Compli-
ance by the Attorney General. A second method for guarding against
abuse of discretion by the Attorney General under the Ethics Act would
be to alter existing Section 595(e) 103 to allow a majority of the members
of either party on the House or Senate Judiciary Committees to apply to
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of
mandamus commanding the Attorney General to comply with the terms
of the statute. This power could be utilized, for instance, if a requisite
number of the specified members of Congress felt that the Attorney Gen-
eral had refused to conduct a preliminary investigation even though he
had received what was clearly specific information from credible sources,
or that he had declined to apply for the appointment of an independent
counsel even though a preliminary investigation showed that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution
101. Provision for Special Prosecutor, supra note 91, at 29-30 (statement of Attorney General
Edward Levi) (the fact that any charge would be disseminated and dignified by such a process
"would inevitably encourage those who wish to use it for partisan or other improper purposes").
102. See Letter from Prof. Philip B. Kurland to Sens. Ribicoff and Percy (July 8, 1976), re-
printed in 122 CONG. Rnc. 23,044-45 (1976). Professor Kurland warned that:
The special prosecutorial mechanism could be triggered whenever a charge of misfeasance,
malfeasance, or nonfeasance was levelled by any person who chose to make such a charge.
This is what I term the "Joe McCarthy" aspect. Just imagine if each of the phony McCar-
thy charges against executive branch officials were to require special prosecutors to investi-
gate and prosecute. Just imagine the official Cohens and Schines who might offer such
charges. Just imagine the extraordinary number of unofficial individuals eager to assert
such charges.
Idk
103. See supra note 76.
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was warranted. Such a provision was included in some of the predeces-
sor bills to what eventually became the Ethics Act. 1°4
One advantage that this suggestion has over the private attorney
general concept is that enforcement of the legal duties of the Attorney
General by mandamus obtained by the House or Senate Judiciary Com-
mittees would not necessarily involve the disclosure of the facts of an
allegation or prosecution that would result from litigation initiated by a
private party in open court. 10 5 Further, the decision to seek a court order
would be made by officials who might be held accountable, at least politi-
cally, for abuse of the process.
One problem with such a mechanism, however, stems from the very
fact that it would be politicians, often of the opposite party of the individ-
ual accused of criminal conduct, who would be making the decision to go
to court. Of course, the district court would make the ultimate decision
as to the legality of the Attorney General's actions, but this does not
totally remove the possibility that an application to the court could be
used for political purposes as a means of challenging the integrity of a
member of the rival political party. In addition to being political, Con-
gress is not primarily an investigative body. Therefore, another problem
with this approach is that only in the most extraordinary and highly pub-
licized cases would Congress learn enough facts about a particular situa-
tion to allow it to make a reasoned decision as to whether to seek a court
order.10 6 Less publicized but still important cases might escape the no-
tice of a body as unwieldy as Congress.10 7
Yet another drawback of such a proposal is that it is doubtful that
Congress could respond adequately to a rapidly-developing situation
even if it had knowledge of the facts.108 Thus, although a mechanism
providing for effective congressional oversight does not seem to pose as
104. See H.R. 2711, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8125, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.
8538, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 10669, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 10868, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978).
105. See Provision for Special Prosecutor, supra note 91, at 160 (statement of Prof. Archibald
Cox).
106. Id at 114 (statement of Charles Ruff, Watergate Special Prosecutor Force). This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that "under present law, it is left entirely up to the Attorney General to
determine whether Congress or the public will even know whether there have been allegations of
high-level misconduct, whether these allegations have been investigated, and the results." 126
CONG. Rnc. 15,264 (1980) (statement of Sen. Weicker).
107. Although it would be the House and Senate Judiciary Committees rather than the entire
Congress that would have the power to seek writs of mandamus against the Attorney General, these
committees have numerous duties to discharge and would be unable to concentrate a great deal of
attention on the propriety of the conduct of large numbers of executive officials.
108. Provision for Special Prosecutor, supra note 91, at 160 (statement of Prof. Archibald Cox)
(questioning "whether in the typical crisis. . . Congress could really respond rapidly enough to
address very practical problems of conducting an investigation or conducting a prosecution").
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many serious problems as the private attorney general notion, it is still
not the best solution.
3. Allow the Special Three-Judge Panel to Review the Ethics Act
Decisions of the Attorney General. A third proposal to amend the Ethics
Act and remove the potential for the Attorney General to thwart the
process in its early stages is to give added power to the special three-
judge panel created by the statute. This proposal would vest in the court
the power to review decisions not to conduct a preliminary investigation
and not to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel. 109
This proposal shares the advantage that characterizes the two previ-
ously discussed: helping to safeguard against politically motivated deci-
sions by the Attorney General not to invoke the independent counsel
mechanism. Further, review of the Attorney General's actions sua
sponte by the court would prevent the premature leaking of potentially
damaging accusations that would result if private citizens were allowed
to bring suit.110 Finally, the fact that federal judges are at least some-
what politically insulated makes it less likely that their determination
would be influenced by partisan considerations.
Despite these favorable points, there would be problems involved in
fitting this sort of sua sponte judicial review into the existing statutory
scheme. For instance, such review would greatly increase the workload
of the panel. In assigning judges to the special panel, priority is given by
109. Although it is beyond the scope of this note to consider the possible constitutional objec-
tions that may be raised to the various proposals, it should be noted that with regard to the envi-
sioned functions the special three-judge panel would be sitting as a panel of appointment to consider
the appointment of an officer of the United States as authorized under section 2 of article II of the
United States Constitution. One constitutional expert has stated that "[these functions, which are
clearly related to, and concomitants of, the power of appointment are.., in my judgment soundly
constitutional." Letter from Prof. Paul J. Mishkin to Sen. Ribicoff (May 10, 1976), reprinted in 123
CONG. REc. 20,997-98 (1977).
Under the current version of the Ethics Act, the special three-judge panel has the power, upon
receipt of an application from the Attorney General, to appoint an appropriate independent counsel
and to define that independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982). The
court is also empowered to fill any vacancy that may occur in the office of independent counsel,
§ 593(e), and to reveal documents that it receives from the Attorney General to outside individuals.
§ 592(b)(3), (d)(2). The court has no power to review decisions of the Attorney General as to
whether to seek appointment of an independent counsel. § 592(0.
A provision vesting such power of review in the court would build upon a recommendation
made by the American Bar Association in 1976 while Congress was considering what form the
legislation should take. Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 and
S. 2036 Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1975) (testi-
mony of William B. Spann, Jr., President-Elect Nominee of the ABA) (explaining ABA's proposal
that "[t]he special court of appointment could act on its own in appointing a temporary special
prosecutor where [the situation demohstrates] the necessity for such an appointment and the Attor-
ney General has refused").
110. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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statute to senior circuit judges and retired justices. 111 Under the current
version of the Ethics Act, the primary responsibility given to the three-
judge panel is to appoint an independent counsel upon receipt of an ap-
plication from the Attorney General and to define that independent
counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction. 112 Given the infrequency with which
allegations under the Ethics Act reach this stage, the special panel may
convene only a few times per year. It is likely that the non-strenuous
nature of these duties is the primary reason that Congress decided to staff
the special panel with retired judges.
If the three judges are given the sole responsibility for guarding
against abuse of discretion by the Attorney General under the Ethics
Act, their burden will be significantly increased both in terms of the fre-
quency with which they will have to sit and the difficult nature of the
decisions that they will have to make based upon a limited record. It is
quite possible that retired judges might not be able to perform adequately
under this strain.113 One scholar, commenting on a similar proposal,
stated that to "entrust them with charge of highly volatile political affairs
is to put dynamite in the hands of the incompetent."'1 4 While this may
be a somewhat harsh assessment of the capabilities of the judges who are
likely to comprise the special panel, it is obvious that some revamping of
this body is necessary before it could be expected to handle the great
oversight responsibility conferred upon it by this proposed amendment.
The simplest way to accomplish this would be to staff the three-judge
panel with sitting rather than senior judges.
Another problem with this proposal under the existing statutory
scheme involves the sort of record that will be available for the special
panel to review in determining whether the Attorney General reached a
correct decision. Section 592(a)(1)115 would have to be changed to com-
pel the Attorney General to provide the court with all of the information
that he has received, rather than simply allowing him not to conduct a
preliminary investigation, upon determining that the information is not
sufficiently "specific" or did not come from "credible" sources. Such a
111. 28 U.S.C. § 49(c) (1982).
112. 28 U.S.C. at § 593(b) (1982).
113. See Letter from Prof. Philip Kurland to Sens. Ribicoff and Percy (July 8, 1976), reprinted in
122 CONG. REc. 23,044-45 (1976). Professor Kurland cautioned that:
You must not think of senior federal judges in terms of Learned Hands or Henry Friend-
lys. Let me assure you that those are the exceptions rather than the rule. Most superannu-
ated judges were of no great competence while they performed active service and have
since necessarily retired for age and the mental deterioration that age brings on.
Id. The three senior circuit judges currently comprising the special panel are Judges Robb, Mans-
field, and Morgan, ages 77, 73, and 71, respectively.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 5.
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provision would give the special panel the requisite data to determine
whether a preliminary investigation is in fact warranted. That the pre-
liminary investigation would be conducted by the Justice Department
may give rise to questions regarding the thoroughness of the probe that
the special panel would review if the Attorney General decides not to
apply for the appointment of an independent counsel. However, such a
danger already exists under the current statute, and the only way to elim-
inate it would be to establish a separate entity to conduct the
investigation.
Of critical importance in such a scheme would be the legal standard
that the special panel would utilize in reviewing the Attorney General's
Ethics Act decisions. Although the decision reviewed by the panel
would be akin to an agency action, a familiar administrative law standard
such as "supported by substantial evidence on the record" may prove
unmanageable due to the difficulty of defining the "record" in such a
case. 116 However, allowing the court to make its own independent deter-
mination as to what decisions should have been reached would seem to
render the Attorney General's function of screening clearly frivolous al-
legations superfluous. Therefore, in order to retain a vital role for a
properly motivated Attorney General, the legal standard to be applied
should be whether the decision was "clearly erroneous," or contrary to
the information possessed by the court. Such a standard would guard
against abuse of discretion by the Attorney General while at the same
time preserving his screening function to some extent.
Overall, it appears that most of the problems that would arise from
an amendment allowing the special panel to review sua sponte the deci-
sions made by the Attorney General result from defects in other provi-
sions of the Ethics Act as it currently stands. Simple adjustments in
these sections to create a more vital special panel and to compel the At-
torney General to provide it with the information he receives concerning
each allegation would make this proposal a possible solution to the
problems with the current Ethics Act while at the same time retaining
the basic framework of the present statute.
4. Establish an Independent Law Enforcement Agency to Adminis-
ter the Ethics Act. Some of the predecessor bills to what eventually be-
came the Ethics Act provided for a specialized entity to deal solely with
116. For example, one problem would be whether the special panel could consider information
other than that provided to it by the Justice Department as part of the "record." A possible solution
to such problems would be to give the court some discretion to define the scope of the record.
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crimes committed by government officials. 117 Such proposals were
flawed, however, in that the agencies that they proposed were to be
within the Justice Department. This factor raises the specter of lack of
independence, which could hardly be said to solve the problem of undue
influence by the Attorney General over the triggering of the independent
counsel mechanism.
A more effective solution, one not previously suggested, would be to
establish an independent law enforcement agency, analogous to, but
much smaller than, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The pro-
posed agency, charged by Congress with administering the Ethics Act,
could consist of three commissioners appointed by the president and con-
firmed by the Senate for staggered terms, with not more than two com-
missioners being members of any one political party. 118 This
"Independent Counsel Commission" could be empowered to receive in-
formation from any source concerning alleged criminal conduct by offi-
cials covered by the Ethics Act and to evaluate it much as the Attorney
General is bound to do under the current statute. If warranted, the
Commission could order a preliminary investigation of the matter, and,
upon considering the results of such a probe, apply to the special three-
judge panel for the appointment of an independent counsel. The duties
of the Independent Counsel Commission could end at this point, leaving
open to the criminal defendant the safeguards, including the right to a
grand jury and a trial by jury, available in federal court should charges
ultimately be brought by the independent counsel.
The idea of creating an independent commission to administer the
Ethics Act has several significant advantages over the three proposals for
reform previously discussed. The Independent Counsel Commission
could conduct its proceedings in camera, thereby avoiding the problem of
premature disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations that would result
from conferring standing upon private citizens to challenge the decisions
of the Attorney General. 19 Only one body would be making decisions as
to whether or not to conduct preliminary investigations or seek appoint-
ment of an independent counsel, eliminating the danger of a multiplicity
of standards that would arise if every district court were allowed to make
such decisions. 120 Further, use of the commission process would ensure
that the result would not depend upon the capability of a single individ-
117. See, eg., S. 495, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (providing for a Division of Government
Crimes within the Justice Department).
118. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (providing details as to the structure of the FTC).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
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ual to litigate effectively. 121
The fact that not more than two of the three commissioners could be
members of the same political party would help to ensure that their deci-
sions would not be influenced unduly by political considerations, a safe-
guard not present in the proposal for increased congressional
oversight.122 Further, unlike Congress, the Independent Counsel Com-
mission would have the flexibility to learn the facts behind allegations
made to it and to respond rapidly enough to developing situations to
administer the Ethics Act effectively. 123
Because the Independent Counsel Commission would be the body to
which information concerning allegations of misconduct by executive of-
ficials would originally be presented, some of the problems that plague
the idea of sua sponte review of the Attorney General's decisions by the
special three-judge panel would be eliminated. For example, there would
be no problem in determining what could be considered part of the "rec-
ord" or what legal standard should be applied.124 Further, the creation
of a commission would eliminate the need to replace the senior judges on
the special panel with active judges.125
On the whole, the proposal for an Independent Counsel Commis-
sion to assume the duties assigned to the Attorney General under the
current scheme is more sensible than the three proposals previously dis-
cussed. The three other possible amendments would relegate the Attor-
ney General to the role of merely ordering a preliminary investigation or
applying for an independent counsel; any contrary decision by him
would be subject to review. It would be more efficient simply to bypass
the Attorney General altogether rather than to assign to him this pedes-
trian task.
An impartial commission of this sort would provide a solution to the
existing problems with the Ethics Act, but the proposal has some practi-
cal drawbacks. Unlike the FTC, the Independent Counsel Commission
may not receive enough complaints to keep it busy. Besides making the
commission a waste of the taxpayers' money, such a situation could
make it difficult to find qualified individuals willing to serve as commis-
121. Id.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 36-51.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
124. See supra text accompanying note 116.
125. The danger of having three active judges with little to do is a more likely prospect than the
danger that the Independent Counsel Commission would not have a sufficient workload. The special
panel would come into play only in situations where it appears that the Attorney General has abused
his discretion, whereas the commission would have the additional duty of making decisions as to
whether to conduct a preliminary investigation or seek appointment of an independent counsel in the
first instance in all cases.
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sioners. Further, a lack of work could lead the commission to accord
undue weight to the allegations that it does receive and might create a
tendency to apply for an independent counsel in unimportant cases in an
attempt to justify its existence. However, the existence of such a com-
mission might encourage submission of substantial allegations from some
individuals who would otherwise remain silent due to their belief that a
partisan Justice Department would give their charges short shrift.126
Given the number of allegations of criminal conduct by high government
officials that are made annually, the proposed commission may well find
itself with an adequate workload.1 27
Another potential problem with this proposal is the question of who
would conduct any preliminary investigation ordered by the commission.
If the probe were done by the Justice Department, there would be the
danger of a cover-up engineered for political purposes. However, this
same problem exists as the Ethics Act is currently structured, and the
fact that the Independent Counsel Commission would review both the
initial allegations and the results of any investigation increases the possi-
bility that at least the more blatant attempts to cover up serious allega-
tions would be revealed. No such safeguard exists under the present
statute.
Even though the idea of an independent agency to enforce the Ethics
Act avoids some of the problems with the three proposals previously dis-
cussed, it may prove difficult to achieve the congressional support neces-
sary to create such a body. Bills providing for a permanent office of
special prosecutor have been rejected by previous Congresses, 128 and the
current trend toward reducing the size of the governmental bureaucracy
would work against the proposal to establish another agency. But the
Independent Counsel Commission would consist of only three members
and would utilize the Department of Justice to conduct its preliminary
investigations, and therefore the number of support personnel required
would be small.
126. Further, the
mere existence of an authority outside the Department of Justice and the Executive Branch
which can make the appointment of a temporary special prosecutor will act as a substantial
deterrent to extreme situations such as Watergate. There are those who believe that cam-
paign misconduct and misconduct by high-level government officials are not rare but sim-
ply flourish when there is little reason to fear prosecution.
S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
127. In testimony before a House subcommittee concerning special prosecutor legislation, a
high-ranking Justice Department official stated that the Attorney General receives "hundreds of
letters from citizens complaining about and making allegations of misconduct." Special Prosecutor
Legislation, supra note 90, at 6 (statement of Acting Assistant Attorney General John M. Harmon).
128. See, eg., H.R. 14795, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (proposing creation of an office of Special
Prosecutor with three-year term and removal only for extraordinary impropriety).
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Further, the Justice Department may actually favor a proposal that
relieved it of the duty to make difficult decisions whether to investigate or
prosecute fellow administration members. Under the current version of
the Ethics Act, the Justice Department must either decline to trigger the
independent counsel process, in which case it is often accused of engag-
ing in a cover-up for political purposes, or choose to proceed even though
the allegations are seemingly frivolous, in which case the public official
involved is subjected to a harsher standard of justice than would be ap-
plied to a private citizen. 129 An independent agency would be free to
make the decision not to proceed without being accused of having parti-
san motivations. 130
IV. CONCLUSION
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court expounded a clear def-
inition of the proper ethical standard for government officials:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer
of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All of the of-
ficers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures
of the law, and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in
our system of government, and every man who by accepting office par-
ticipates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives. 131
In 1978, in a belated reaction to the Watergate affair, Congress at-
tempted to effectuate such a standard of conduct by passing the Ethics in
Government Act, which was designed to prevent the executive branch
from thwarting, out of political expediency, attempts to prosecute high
executive officials for serious criminal conduct. As the Nathan and
Banzhaf cases have demonstrated, however, the Ethics Act as presently
drafted allows the Attorney General to make nonreviewable, discretion-
ary decisions that can short-circuit the independent counsel mechanism.
In order to fully accomplish the stated purpose of the Ethics Act, Con-
gress must amend it to provide for some sort of review of the Attorney
129. See S. REp. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982) (Ethics Act "creates unfairness by
imposing a stricter application of criminal law on public officials than that imposed on private citi-
zens" and "wastes valuable Department of Justice resources by requiring high priority investigations
in situations where no one else would be investigated").
130. The Attorney General is a political appointee whose job, in some measure, is dependent
upon political considerations. Even an Attorney General who seeks to apply the Ethics Act with
complete objectivity may be subjected to political pressure from other members of the executive
branch. By taking the decision out of his hands, the Independent Counsel Commission may be
removing from the Attorney General one of his most unpleasant tasks--deciding whether or not to
investigate a person with whom he is politically affiliated.
131. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
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General's decisions or remove those decisions from him entirely. The
idea of creating an independent law enforcement agency to administer
the Ethics Act- seems to be the best of the proposals discussed in this
note, but any one of them would improve upon the existing statute. All
therefore merit serious congressional consideration.
Stephen Charles Mixter
